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Corruption and Merit in the African
Higher Education System: Legal, Policy
and Sociological Reflections
CRISTIANO D’ORSI*

ABSTRACT
This article analyses, under legal, political, and sociological aspects, the
plight of corruption in Higher Education in Africa. On one side, the fight
against corruption on the continent seems to use a growing number of legal
instruments, at all levels (international, regional, sub-regional and domestic)
on the other hand, however, it clashes against rooted traditions and a
common mentality that often seem to justify acts of corruption in African
academia. Through my work, I shed light on this, at least apparent,
dichotomy and to make a synthesis of the various positions that can be found
in Africa regarding this sensitive topic and provide recommendations in
order to define a corrupted act how it deserves to be defined, which is an act
undermining the growth and the real development of academia on the
continent.

*An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual ASIL Mid-Year Meeting, held on

11-12 November 2021. Cristiano would like to thank Professor Adrien Wing (University of
Iowa College of Law), Professor Konstantinos Magliveras (University of the Aegean) and
Doctor David Hughes, (University of Ottawa) for their insightful comments on previous drafts
of this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
According to former Tanzanian President, J Nyerere, a university is “an
institution of higher learning, a place where people’s minds are trained for
clear thinking, for independent thinking, for analysis and for problem solving
at the highest level.”1 Historically, African universities have three key roles
to play in boosting national development, namely, the pursuit of learning,
preparation for service and organizing, implementing and evaluating
research.2 Yet, in most African countries, corruption3 is rife. Considered the
“bane of African development,”4 corruption is now systemic, in the form of
both “petty corruption” taking place between civil servants and citizens and
in the form of “big corruption” involving, for example, senior civil servants,
members of parliament and members of the government.5 In this context, in
recent years, many civil servants in Africa have engaged in what can be
described as the “privatization of the state,” using its structures as
instruments of plunder to accumulate personal wealth.6 The higher education
sector has not been immune from this phenomenon. In his 1967 pivotal study
on corruption, Nye argues that corruption involves
Behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because
of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status
gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of privateregarding influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of
reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust): nepotism
(bestowal of patronage due to ascriptive relationship rather than merit);
and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for privateregarding uses.7

1. Herme J. Mosha, The Role of African Universities in National Development: A
Critical Analysis, 22 COMPAR. EDUC. 93, 94 (1986).
2. Id. at 99.
3. See Samuel Zalanga, The Political Economy of Corruption, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK
OF AFRICAN POLITICS, GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT 869, 869-882 (Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba &
Toyin Falola eds. 2018).
4. Ferdinand O. Ottoh, Ethnic Identity and Conflicts in Africa, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK
OF AFR. POL., GOVERNANCE DEV. 342, 334-352 (Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba & Toyin Falola eds.
2018).
5. Jean-Pierre Oliver de Sardan, The Informal Practices of Civil Servants, in Routledge
Handbook African Politics (2013, Routledge) 70-80 at 70-71. See also, John Mukum Mbaku,
The International Dimension of Africa’s Struggle against Corruption, 10 ASPER REV. INT’L
BUS. & TRADE L. 35 (2010).
6. See John Mukum Mbaku, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES CONSEQUENCES, AND
CLEANUPS 64 (Lexington Books 2007).; accord. Victor Ojakorotu, Resource Control and
Conflict in Africa, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK AFRICAN POLITICS, GOVERNANCE
DEVELOPMENT 367, 378 (S.O. Oloruntoba and T. Falola eds. 2018).
7. J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM.
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According to Fernandez, the identity of the colonial power is strongly
correlated with the level of corruption prevalent in Africa. He elaborates that,
for example, Lusophone colonies seemed to show lower levels of corruption
compared with Anglophone and Francophone colonies. The lower levels of
corruption in Lusophone countries could be attributed to the fact that,
contrary to what happened in the British and French colonies, Portugal never
bothered to give the indigenous population representation at the local level,
as it did not regard Africans as citizens. Assimilation into the colonial state
was so restricted that assimilados (definition) constituted only a small
fraction of the indigenous population.8 On the other hand, Nel maintains that
legal institutions based on the common law tradition are associated with
lower levels of corruption than other legal traditions because the former
entails law-making by judges, based on precedents, rather than on civil codes
developed by scholars and passed by governments.9
After these preliminary reflections, this study is structured as follows:
first, I briefly analyse the role of corruption and merit in the African higher
education system, examining the international legal instruments to fight
corruption and consequently to promote merit, as applicable to the African
context. Second, I investigate the role of Ubuntu as a mean of justifying (or
condemning) attitudes in African academia. Third, I discuss several practices
still in use in African universities, such as nepotism and gift-giving and how
these practices undermine the credibility of higher education on the
continent. Fourth, I explore legal and policy initiatives at domestic, subregional and regional levels to enhance higher education on the continent. At
the domestic level, I only analyse a select number of countries. Given the
restricted length of this paper, it is not possible to examine higher education
in all 54 sovereign states in Africa. As a final point, I conclude with
reflections on the present situation of higher education in Africa and propose
recommendations to change it.

I. CONCERNS IN DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING CORRUPTION AND
MERIT

The inability or failure of many African countries to establish efficient

POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967).
8. See Lovell Fernandez, A Survey of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Initiatives in
Africa, 2 JACL 31, 39-40 (2018); see, e.g., Simon Coldham, Legal Responses to State
Corruption in Commonwealth Africa, 39 J. AFR. L. 115, 116 (1995); accord. Stuart S. Yeh,
Corruption and the Rule of Law in Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 192
(2011).
9. Philip Nel, Corruption, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 649, 658
(T. Binns, K. Lynch and E. Nel eds. 2018).
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and professional bureaucracies with competent, well-trained, and highly
skilled civil servants is one of the reasons the prevalence of corruption in
Africa is so extensive.10 In many African countries, especially those with less
open and less participatory political systems, a significant number of people
in top civil service positions are political appointees with strong connections
to the ruling party. Higher education is not exempt from this phenomenon.11
It is clear that where higher education is corrupt, hiring decisions will not be
made based on the candidates’ qualifications and skills, but on non-jobrelated factors such as the candidate’s political connections.12
Culture is another factor contributing to high rates of corruption in
several African societies. The main argument is that corruption in many
countries can be traced to flawed cultural norms within those societies. In
this way, corruption arises from the clash between traditional cultural values
and the norms imported from the so-called ‘developed countries,’ along with
modernisation.13
One of the most controversial aspects in higher education systems is the
role that merit plays and whether (and how much) it is sacrificed to
corruption. To scrutinize this relationship, we should first agree whether
there are African concepts of merit and corruption that are shared by the 54
sovereign African states and are applicable to higher education. The
2003 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
(AU Convention on Corruption)14 represents a significant step in the
development of continental standards to counteract systemic corruption
across Africa. However, this legal instrument has been criticised for several
reasons. One of the reasons is that it “[n]either characterises large scale
corruption, nor what has been described as indigenous spoliation, as a
massive and direct violation of economic, social and cultural rights nor
comprehensively addresses the critical links between corruption and those
rights.”15 In addition, the AU Convention on Corruption does not provide for
the granting of civil remedies to persons who have suffered damage because
of acts of corruption nor does it contemplate a single provision, setting out
10. Mbaku, supra note 6, at 64.
11. See, e.g., Ibrahim Oanda, How Political Interference Keeps Hurting Africa’s
Universities, THE CONVERSATION (May 12 2016), https://theconversation.com/how-politicalinterference-keeps-hurting-africas-universities-58387 (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
12. Supra note 5.
13. See, e.g., Joseph G. Jabbra, Bureaucratic Corruption in the Third World: Causes and
Remedies, 22 IND. J. PUB. ADMIN. 673, 673 (1976).
14. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 43 I.L.M. 5
(2004).
15. Kolawole Olaniyan, African Union (AU): Convention on Preventing and Combatting
Corruption, 43 I.L.M. 1, 4 (2004).
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the procedure or forum for settling any disputes that may arise in connection
with the interpretation or application of its provisions.16
Moreover, highlighting how certain concepts may have a different
meaning depending on the context, the four official texts of the convention
(English, French, Portuguese and Arabic) often fail to convey exactly the
same concepts.17 However, the AU Convention on Corruption acts as an
umbrella over state parties, drafting their domestic legal framework in a way
to avoid inconsistencies with international legal frameworks.18 The doctrine
also seems to agree that this convention characterises corruption as a
phenomenon depriving people of the enjoyment of human rights in general.19
Violations of the right to education may occur through the direct actions of
state actors or through their failure to take the required action. For example,
several acts of corruption can amount to a violation of the right to education.
The right to education is consecrated in Article 17 of the 1981 African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter).20 However,
corruption may deny this right, for instance, through the theft of funds or
through the appointment of teachers based on political connections. The right
to education is also violated when a state fails to establish an effective
institutional and regulatory mechanism to avert and fight corruption.21
Bribery to gain admission to educational institutions or to obtain favourable
grades22 are other examples.23 Corruption is also mentioned in another
African legal document––the African Charter on Values and Principles of

16. Lucky Bryce Jnr. Jatto, Africa's Approach to the International War on Corruption: A
Critical Appraisal of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, 10 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 79, 95-6 (2010).
17. Peter W. Schroth, The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, 49 J. AFR. L. 24, 25 (2005).
18. Lesotho Safara and Kola O. Odeku, Critical legal perspective of international anticorruption laws for tackling corruption in South Africa,10 PERSPECTIVES L. PUB. ADMIN. 203,
215 (2021).
19. Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption through International Law
in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691, 745 (2007).
20. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. No.
26363, 217.
21. Kolawole Olaniyan, Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa 254-55 (2014);
accord. SERAP v. Nigeria, Judgment, ECW/CCJ/APP/12/07; ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/10 ¶4-¶6,
¶17 (ECOWAS, Nov. 30, 2010).
22. See Monica Kirya, Curbing Corruption in Higher Education, CURBING CORRUPTION
(June 2021), https://curbingcorruption.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/210618-CurbingCorruption-in-Higher-Education.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
23. Richard Lapper, Understanding Corruption in Education as a Human Rights Issue, in
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: EDUCATION 16, 17 (Transparency International eds. 2013);
accord. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).

Summer 2022

HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

103

Public Service and Administration (African Charter of Administration). 24
Article 12 (“Preventing and combating corruption”) urges state parties to
adopt laws and policies to fight corruption by establishing independent anticorruption institutions (para 1) and “national accountability and integrity
systems to promote value-based societal behaviour and attitudes as a means
of preventing corruption” (para 3). The main purpose of the African Charter
of Administration is to define the general rules and principles superseding
African public services, with the objective of building state capability. This
charter also functions as a policy framework for the public service
administrations of African countries as well as an incentive for the
development and strengthening of national codes of conduct pertaining to
ethical standards, professionalism, and transparency.25
The acts listed in Article 4 (“Scope of application”) of the AU
Convention on Corruption can also be applied to higher education while
Article 1 defines a “public official,”26 that is normally the corrupted figure
in Higher Education. Similar definitions are also provided by the 2003 UN
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) that has been widely ratified in
Africa, except for Eritrea and Somalia.27 Yet, neither the AU Convention on
Corruption nor the UNCAC explicitly address the phenomenon of corruption
in academia in any of their articles. However, Snider and Kidane urge states
parties to the AU Convention on Corruption to accede to the UNCAC as well
because that would be “the best way of addressing issues involved in the
cross-continent corruption that is seriously affecting Africa’s
development.”28
In addition, African states that are parties to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention)29 are under a duty to
criminalize corruption (Article 8 “Criminalization of Corruption”)30 and
therefore those African states that have ratified the AU Convention on
Corruption and are parties to the Palermo Convention31 are under a stricter

24. African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, art.
30, Jan. 31, 2011, O.S.H.S.G.A.U., No.16.
25. M Busieka, The African Charter: An Enabler of Good Governance, 10 AFR. J. PUB.
AFF. 44, 51-2 (2018).
26. African Union Convention, supra note 14, art. 1 (1).
27. U.N. Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. No. 42146, 41.;
accord. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. for the Negot. of a Convention against Corruption on the
Work of Its First-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 7, 2003).
28. Snider & Kidane, supra note 19, at 747.
29. U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225
U.N.T.S. No. 39574, 209.
30. Supra note 6, at 10.
31. U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225
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regime. The question is, of course, what these states have done to implement
these conventions. Moreover, Article 4(m) (“Principles”) of the AU
Constitutive Act32 suggests that the notion of “good governance” includes
anti-corruption as well33 and, therefore, this should be a principle guiding the
function of the AU.
Specifically referencing to corruption within higher education in Africa,
anti-corruption experts are urging improvements in the governance and
leadership of public universities.34 According to Salmi, all African
governments should establish a regulatory framework for tertiary education
systems, with adequate provisions to punish corrupt behaviour at all levels.
He suggests that university senates, independent financial review boards and
national university accreditation boards should provide leadership in fighting
corruption.35
To operate in a more transparent manner, African universities are also
encouraged to ensure that funds obtained through corruption are not donated
or invested in higher education. There have been cases in several countries
(e.g. Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Nigeria) where money misappropriated
from public institutions had been channelled to universities.36 When public
tertiary education institutions are given autonomy by the state, they must, in
return, be responsible for the use of public resources, the orientation of their
operations with public policy goals and their overall performance.37 Given
that corruption is endemic in most universities in Africa, it is necessary to
crackdown on academic fraud such as “soft marking”, copying from other
students, cheating during examinations and impersonation. For example, in
Ethiopia, academic dishonesty most commonly takes the form of cheating in
exams and plagiarism.38 These behaviours were often tolerated and swept
under the carpet through corruption.
Universities should also monitor and punish cases of falsified academic

U.N.T.S. No. 39574, 209.
32. Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. No. 37733, 3.
33. Supra note 6 at 7; accord. A.U. Afr. Gov. Rep., 4.7.1. (2019).
34. Ebrima Sall and Ibrahim Oanda, Framing Paper on Higher Education Leadership in
Africa,
COUNCIL
FOR
THE
DEV.
OF
SOC.
SCI.
RSCH.
IN
AFR.,
https://codesria.org/spip.php?article2296 (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
35. Jamil Salmi, The Growing Accountability Agenda in Tertiary Education: Progress
or Mixed Blessing? 3-4 (Education Working Paper Series No. 16. (2009); see also, Jamil
Salmi and R. Matross Helms, Governance Instruments to Combat Corruption in Higher
Education, supra note 23 at 108-109.
36. Kigotho, supra note 142.
37. Salmi & Matross Helms, supra note 152 at 111.
38. Solomon W. Feday, Academic Dishonesty in Ethiopian Higher Education and Its
Implication for Corruption, 8 BEIJING L. REV. 10, 13 (2017).
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records; paying for grades with gifts, money, or sexual favours;39
intimidating examiners; and assaulting invigilators. Such practices
undermine educational opportunities for students and produce graduates who
are ill equipped to succeed in their future careers. To do so, African countries
should review their education systems to incorporate moral and ethical
teachings, particularly at the primary and secondary levels.
Against this backdrop, merit is not easy to define. The UNCAC
mentions it just once, in Article 7 on the public sector, without any further
explanation,40 while the AU Convention on Corruption remains silent on it.
The African Charter of Administration is therefore the “bolder” instrument
because it proclaims “merit” as an essential element of the recruitment
process of public service agents (Article 19 “Recruitment”). Despite its
silence on merit, the AU Convention on Corruption introduces several
innovations. One of its most innovative provisions, targeting education, is
the requirement by which the state parties must
[a]dopt and strengthen mechanisms for promoting the education of
populations to respect the public good and public interest, and awareness
in the fight against corruption and related offences, including school
educational programs and sensitization of the media, and the promotion of
an enabling environment for the respect of ethics.41

This provision is of paramount importance, especially in humanistic
societies where efforts are made to re-interpret morality in every aspect of
life.42 Due to the corruption in the public service of many African states and
considering the role that this service plays in national development, state
parties must commit to adopting specific measures to grapple with
corruption in the public service (public universities included). This includes,
inter alia, the promise to create an internal committee mandated to establish
a code of conduct and to monitor its implementation, sensitise and train
public officials on matters of ethics,43 while at the same time developing
disciplinary measures and investigation procedures to fight corruption.44
Additionally, to promote merit, is also crucial to guarantee transparency,
equity, and efficiency in offering and hiring procedures in the public

39. Fiona Leach, Corruption as Abuse of Power: Sexual Violence in Educational
Institutions, supra note 23, 88-98 at 90.
40. Supra note 27, at 10-11.
41. African Union Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(8), see also Olaniyan, supra note 15,
at 80.
42. Nsongurua Udombana, Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa's Anti-Corruption
Convention, SING. J. INT’L & COMPAR. LAW, 447 at 485 (2003).
43. African Union Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(2).
44. Supra, art. 7(3).
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service.45 Finally, state parties to the AU Convention on Corruption also
commit to ensure that, subject to the provisions of domestic legislation, any
immunity granted to public officials shall not be an obstacle to the
investigation of allegations against and the prosecution of such officials.46 In
contrast, Article 13 (“Participation of society”) of the UNCAC mentions
university. This is because the participation of society in raising public
awareness of the phenomenon of corruption can be also achieved through
“[p]ublic education programs including school and university curricula.”
In this context, the applicability of the principle of merit has historically
been an argumentative topic and, as I briefly mentioned above, African
politicians have traditionally tended to establish control over universities
through their administration, usually through political appointments without
due consideration for academic merit. Therefore, “yes men” and a culture of
silence are maintained at African universities47 because party loyalty, rather
than merit, decides promotion prospects within academia.48
Central to the debate between liberals (proponents) and egalitarians
(critics) of meritocracy is the notion of “deservingness,” which suggests that
individuals should obtain only what they deserve. Against this backdrop,
deservingness or reward is dependent on one or more of the following
elements––contribution, effort, and compensation––with the latter requiring
proportionality of reward and cost.49 Nevertheless, two requirements should
be in place for the principle of “deservingness” to be applied. First, there
should be equality of opportunity: everyone should have equal access to
compete for the same resources. Second, it is necessary for the measures to
be the same for all (the “fairness” condition of meritocracy).50
On the other hand, meritocracy, implying a scheme of rewards (based
on deservingness), raises questions of justice. This is because if under ideal
circumstances, individuals could be rewarded based on their contribution, in
the reality, there will always individuals whose reward will not be
proportionate to their contribution. Additionally, equitable beginnings are
not the norm but the exception. On top of that, some individuals are unable

45. Supra, art. 7(4).
46. Supra, art. 7(5).
47. Mosha, supra note 1, at 98.
48. D. Olowu, Bureaucratic Morality in Africa, 9 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. No. 3, 215, at 217
(1988).
49. T.A. Teklu, Meritocracy and Inequality: Moral Considerations, 4/4 PALGRAVE
COMMC’N 1, at 2 (2018).
50. G. Schweiger, Unemployment, Recognition and Meritocracy, 3 LAS TORRES DE
LUCCA No. 4, 37, at 51 (2014).
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to contribute through no fault of their own.51 How should such a situation be
addressed? The situation is not as easy as it may seem at first sight.
Recruiting based on merit indicates that the best candidate should obtain a
job; however, that does not necessarily mean that there are enough jobs for
everyone. In any event, a commitment by African universities to eliminate
academic unemployment does not challenge the idea that better positions
should be achieved through merit.52 Several studies have drawn attention to
the “paradox of meritocracy.” When the culture of a country clearly
promotes meritocracy, recruiters may show more gender favouritism (to the
detriment of women).53 This means that in those countries where women
have less access to higher education than men, it would certainly be more
“meritocratic” to recruit men for top jobs (because they would be better
qualified for those jobs). However, can a society be considered
“meritocratic” if men almost exclusively have access to higher education?
Certainly not.
Kim and Choi consider meritocracy as a vehicle for social mobility and
encourage people to do their best to achieve the ultimate goals of academia–
–to provide a “higher education.”54 Yet, the authors note that the concept of
meritocracy is still evolving because the notion of merit within a society may
differ in relation to the cultural context.55 In this scenario, African institutions
often use the meritocracy explanation by assigning the cause of a student’s
failure exclusively to the student. This suggests that the university is neutral
when, in fact, it is not.56 In several African countries, the problem of social
class interconnects in multifaceted ways with gender, race, and other social
structures of difference. This could trigger concerns about the role of
universities in reinforcing, instead of combatting, social inequalities.57 This
may occur because universities convey the idea that education is at the core
of meritocracy. Yet, in many African countries, students who are enrolled at
the same university have very different cultural backgrounds based on the
school they attended before university.58 Their cultural background may
limit their learning ability at university and ultimately affect their future
51. Teklu, supra note 48, at 2.
52. Schweiger, supra note 49, at 54.
53. Alikhan Baimenov & Max Everest-Phillips, Meritocracy for Public Service
Excellence, GLOB. CTR. FOR PUB. SERV. EXCELLENCE 7 (2015).
54. C.H. Kim & Y.B. Choi, How Meritocracy Is Defined Today? Contemporary Aspects
of Meritocracy, 10 ECON. & SOCIO. No. 1, 112, at 117 (2017).
55. Id., at 118.
56. S. Sobuwa & S. McKenna, The Obstinate Notion That Higher Education Is A
Meritocracy, 7 CRIT. STUD. TEACHING & LEARNING No. 2, 1, at 4 & 8 (2019).
57. Id., at 5.
58. Id., at 10.
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career.
Based on the preceding discussion, it would be easy to agree with
Transparency International59 and U460 when they affirm that corruption is
common in most universities in Africa.61 However, the acts representing
corruption are not always deemed as such in Africa, and can, in some cases,
be justified. I examine this aspect in the next paragraphs.

II. OBSERVATIONS ON THE ROLE OF UBUNTU IN AFRICAN
SOCIETIES

Ubuntu is an African moral theory that plays an important role in
African societies. The concept has received attention from a myriad of
scholars. Broodryk defines Ubuntu as “a comprehensive, ancient worldview
which pursues primary values of intense humanness, caring, sharing and
compassion and associated values, ensuring a happy and quality community
life in a family spirit or atmosphere.”62 The concept of Ubuntu is found in
several countries in Africa although it is known by different names.63 Its
diffusion has allowed scholars to conclude that the foundations of Ubuntu
exist in “the admittedly embryonic altruistic inclination of humankind”.64
According to Senghor, the first president of Senegal after independence, the
Ubuntu philosophy is founded on African family ideology. He emphasises
the fact that African understanding of family differs substantially from the
“Western” understanding. Senghor elaborates that African family is not
restricted to parents but rather, it embraces all individuals sharing the same
ancestral lineage. Hence, the African family system is described as a “natural
and spiritual union in which the living, dead and the unborn commune with
each other in all its extended roots.”65 Broodryk’s definition shows that
Ubuntu advocates for the common good of the public. It is a notion of
59. J. Pope, Corruption in Africa: The Role for Transparency International (TI), 20
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL., 1468, at 1472 (1994).
60. U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION RESOURCE CENTRE, https://www.u4.no/about-u4 (last visited
Oct. 10, 2021).
61. Monica Kirya, Corruption in Universities: Paths to Integrity in the Higher Education
Subsector, 10 U4 ISSUE 1, 4-5 (2019).
62. Johann Broodryk, UBUNTU MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY: EXPORTING ANCIENT
AFRICAN WISDOM INTO THE GLOBAL WORLD 4 (Knowres Publishing 2005); see also,
R. Mugumbate & A. Chereni, Now, The theory of Ubuntu Has Its Space in Social Work, 10
AFR. J. SOC. WORK 5, at 6 (2020).
63. Mugumbate and Chereni, supra note 61 at 6.
64. P.D. De Kock & J.M.T. Labuschagne, Ubuntu as a Conceptual Directive in Realising
a Culture of Effective Human Rights, 62/1 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINSHOLLANDSE REG 114, at 119 (1999).
65. See N.K. Okoro, Ubuntu Ideality: The Foundation Of African Compassionate and
Humane Living, 8 J. SCI. RSCH. & REP., 1, at 3 (2015).
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common good that sees human life as communalistic and inter-connected.
On this basis, no individual within the ethic of Ubuntu should discriminate,
disrespect or act dishonestly while discharging public service. Instead, civil
servants should show respect and honesty.
Ubuntu considers human action by the level at which it affects public
life. The concept believes in the human being and his/her different
behaviours, which brings about harmonious living and thereby produces
happiness in people.66 By extension, this means that individuals are treated
equally. As Ubuntu is about relationships between people, it calls individuals
to see the law as part of the normative structure that links them together. In
obeying the law, people celebrate that normative structure and contribute to
its conservation. Ubuntu considers the act of obeying law as part of caring
for others; it is in the interests of other members of the community. However,
Ubuntu also calls on individuals to disobey a “bad” law, as disobeying it is
in the interests of the broader community.67 The problem often lies in what
exactly constitutes a “bad” law. This term could be interpreted as a law
oppressing the community. By extension, a law that guarantees transparency
in academia should not be considered “bad,” given that it is not oppressing
the community.68 Against this backdrop, human rights violations are ways of
seriously undermining people’s capacity for communal relationships.
Communal relationships that are conceived as identity and solidarity, whose
disrespect principally takes the form of a significant degree of anti-social
behaviour, for instance, division.69 Another unique feature of Ubuntu is the
emphasis it places on reconciliation as opposed to punishment or
retribution.70
Ubuntu made its debut in the jurisprudence of the South African
Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane. On that occasion, Justice Mokgoro
held that:
Metaphorically, [Ubuntu] expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu
ngabantu,71 describing the significance of group solidarity on survival

66. A. Schutte, AFRICAN ETHICS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE AND APPLIED
ETHICS, 85, at 97 (M. F. Murove ed., University of Kwazulu-Natal Press) (2009); see also,
N. Ahiauzu, Ubuntu and the Obligation to Obey the Law, 37 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 17, at 33
(2006).
67. Ahiauzu, supra note 65 at 33-34.
68. Id., at 35-36.
69. T. Metz, Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa, 11 AFR. HUM.
RTS. L. J. 532, at 545 (2011).
70. C. Himonga, M. Taylor & A. Pope, Reflections on Judicial Views of Ubuntu, 16
POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 369, at 381 (2013).
71. The literal translation from this Zulu proverb is “a person is a person through other
persons”.
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issues so central to the survival of communities. While it envelops the key
values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity,
conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it
denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human
dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation. 72

Justice Langa continues:
It is a culture, which places some emphasis on communality and on the
interdependence of the members of a community. It recognises a person’s
status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value
and acceptance from the members of the community [that] such person
happens to be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person
has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and
acceptance to each member of that community. More importantly, it
regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and coresponsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.73

Critics of Ubuntu question the concept on several grounds. First, they
claim that it is too vague to be of any effective use.74 However, Bennett
maintains that as a “metanorm,” Ubuntu is unavoidably broad. Bennett
describes Ubuntu as “a representation of the right way of living.”75 Against
this backdrop, Justice Patel notes that the essential basis to the South African
Constitution and democracy is Ubuntu.76 Finally, according to Okoro, the
Ubuntu ideal also constitutes the seed of African jurisprudence. A crime
committed by one individual involves the entire community. 77 Notably,
African social justice tends to sustain remedies along with punishments,
aiming to bring people together in a mutual and harmonious life of the

72. S. v Makwanyane & Another, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 218, ¶308 (Jun. 6, 1995) (6) BCLR
665.
73. Id. at ¶224; see also, I.J. Kroeze, Doing Things With Values II: The Case of Ubuntu,
13 STELLENBOSCH L. REV., 252, at 256 (2002).
74. Metz, supra note 68 at 558 (“This defence has taken the form of showing that even if
various construal of Ubuntu up to now have been vague….”). Contra, Himonga, supra note
69 at 384-85 (“We might accept the claim that terms derive their meaning from specific
linguistic contexts; but in our view this is part of the reason that the terms are not empty. We
submit that they can be legitimately and meaningfully employed by judges. It is difficult to
see why words like humaneness, compassion or dignity are emptier than any other terms. The
fact that abstract notions are difficult to explain does not make them empty.”).
75. Thomas Bennett, Ubuntu: An African Equity, 40 POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 29, 4647 (2011). See also, Kroeze, supra note 72 at 260 (“[U]buntu is said to include the following
values: communality, respect, dignity, value, acceptance, sharing, co-responsibility,
humaneness, social justice, fairness, personhood, morality, group solidarity, compassion, joy,
love, fulfilment, conciliation….”); Himonga, supra note 69 at 382.
76. Himonga, supra note 69 at 392.
77. Okoro, supra note 64 at 6.
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community.78

III. CONTRIBUTION OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEM TO
NEPOTISM AND THE PRACTICE OF GIFT-GIVING AS
UNDERMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION

In Africa, nepotism is often associated with ethnic balance,79 it is the
act of favouring a member of one’s family in the distribution of resources at
the expense of others. It is therefore necessary to examine whether it is best
to practice nepotism or whether, within the Ubuntu ethical system, the best
result would be produced if civil servants did not favour their family
members in the distribution of government resources at the expense of
others. According to Heath, consistent with the logic of academic nepotism,
“[p]eople are appointed not because of their qualifications or experience;
[consequently, they] are not able to do, nor interested in doing, the work
pertaining to the position.”80 Practically, the word “nepotism” falls short of
Ubuntu. Ubuntu demands that the happiness of everyone in the community
should be promoted.81 Where family members are favoured over others, the
happiness produced will be limited, compared with the pain it will produce
in the community since a community is always bigger than a family.
Applying Ubuntu in this regard throws things open to those who are best
qualified, so that it will be clear from all indications that there were no traces
of bias. It is with this attitude that the community can begin to experience
harmony. What this shows is that Ubuntu and nepotism do not make good
bedfellows; they contradict one another. In view of this, within academia, it
has been suggested that when cooperation among actors is socially harmful
(for example, collusion among academics), nepotism should be discouraged
through anonymity rules. Thus, the grading of students be conducted while
maintaining their anonymity, without revealing their gender or ethnic
background. By avoiding identification through group affiliation, it is hoped
that uniform treatment will naturally ensure.82
Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that the socio-cultural structure
in Africa often has its origins in tribal and kinship relations. These extended

78. Janis Sarra & Kim Berman, Ubuntu as a Tool for Resilience: Arts, Microbusiness,
and Social Justice in South Africa, 34 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 455, 466 (2017).
79. Olowu, supra note 47 at 218.
80. William Heath, South Africa: Public Sector Corruption, 7 J. FIN. CRIME 373, 374
(2000).
81. E.g., Drucilla Cornell & Karin van Marle, Exploring Ubuntu: Tentative Reflections,
5 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 195, 219 (2000) (quoting Justice A Sachs).
82. Chaim Fershtman, Uri Gneezy & Frank Verboven, Discrimination and Nepotism;
The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule, 34 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 371, 372 (2005).
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family ties constitute the basic institutions that shape the individual’s social
values and norms.83 In turn, these values and norms encourage nepotism in
African societies, prompting individuals to fulfil their responsibilities
towards their family. Tribal systems require strong commitment from
individuals towards their tribe, which promotes nepotism if it concerns
relatives. This observation confirms the fact that there is an existential link
between the extended family system and nepotism. The African extended
family places significant pressure on the civil servant, forcing him/her to
engage in nepotism.84 The fact that nepotism is common in Africa clearly
indicates that the kinship bond is strong on this continent as compared with
other parts of the world. Does this mean that traditional African society
promoting such practices is immoral? This may be how it appears at first
glance, but to draw such a conclusion would amount to imposing modern
systems of moral evaluation on a society where there is no basis for such
imposition. Traditional African societies, in which the language of nepotism
is alien, see nothing wrong with a civil servant helping his relatives, friends,
and in-laws, when he is in a position to do so. The reason for this is clear:
peoples’ culture, despite the presence of Ubuntu, requires them to help
relatives in need and to be their brothers’ keepers. No traditional African
would be ashamed to be caught helping a relative, friend or in-law. It is this
traditional African interpretation of the extended family system that is
imported wholesale into modern society without taking cognisance of the
differences between both societies. Accordingly, those who are involved in
nepotism, (to the detriment of common good) and those who benefit from
this misconduct may see nothing wrong with it or try to downplay its gravity
because they think that it is a part of society. Consequently, instead of
opposing nepotism, what most Africans do is to wait for their turn when their
ally occupies the same position and favours them in the same way. In this
83. Monde Madiwane & Chammah Kaunda, Families and Inclusive Societies in Africa,
U.N. DEPT. ECON. SOC. AFFS., 2 (undated) (last visited Oct. 10, 2021)
https://www.un.org/development/desa/family/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2018/05/1-2.pdf
(“A family is generally constituted by three processes, which are blood relations, sexual
unions or adoption. Societally sanctioned sexual unions between (two and in cases of
polygamous unions, which are not uncommon in Africa, more than two) adults, and on the
other hand, blood relations in Africa typically constitute wider relationship than those that are
characteristically in western nuclear families. African families are typically extended to aunts,
uncles, grandparents, cousins and other relatives that form a family that functions in unison
…. This may be viewed as a very inclusive family system, which models the broader inclusive
nature and type of African communities, creating a family-like lens through which several
social actors are included and relationships interpreted. Obligations to wider kin vary with
time, and typically more widely invoked during times of crises …. and this remains a common
practice in extended families on the continent, despite social change.”).
84. John Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Clean-ups, 16 CATO
J. 99, 104 (1996).
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regard, Otaluka explains:
To encourage corruption is not the same thing as being corrupt. That the
extended family system encourages corruption does not make the practice
corrupt. Just as the best intention can lead to the worst results, a good
cultural practice can become perverted and put into the most heinous use.85

However, a survey of university students in Ghana and Nigeria found
that nepotism was one of the main forms of corruption in higher education
in that country.86 This suggests that while the extended family remains the
cornerstone of many African cultures, the nuclear family is starting to
become a reality, particularly in large cities.87 Finally, there is nothing wrong
with a person helping their relative, so long as it does not cause damage to
others or undermine the common good. More importantly, Africans should
not badge their important relatives with requests, because doing so is
considered abuse of the extended family system, and therefore, should be
considered as one of the causes of corruption on the continent.88
In this context, the idea that some African cultural practices and values
have elements that favour the spread of corruption is real. This occurs, for
example, in the African customary exchanges of gifts. In African culture,
“there are conventions which demand or expect that a person show
appreciation for favours done to him.”89 In this regard, Rose-Ackerman
affirms that corruption may have different connotations in different societies:
“One person’s bribe is another person’s gift”, she says.90 In this context, gift85. Wisdom Otaluka, The Cultural Roots of Corruption: An Ethical Investigation with
Particular Reference to Nepotism, 12 (Jan. 2017) (Ph.D. thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal)
(on file with author).
86. Kirya, supra note 60 at 11.
87. Mbaku, supra note 5 at 695. Cf., Joan Aldous, Urbanization, the Extended Family,
and Kinship Ties in West Africa, 41 SOC. FORCES 6, 11 (1962) (“[K]inship relations are not
maintained unless they serve some purpose for those involved. In the African cities of
Brazzaville, Dakar, Lagos, Leopoldville and Stanleyville, the extended family is indeed
functional. Besides filling recreational, religious, legal or economic needs of urbanites, it
substitutes for a non-existent public social welfare programme.”). See also, Shibi v. Sithole
2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 49-50 (S. Afr.).
88. Otaluka, supra note 84 at 116.
89. Veronica Okeke, CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: A THEORETICAL APPRAISAL, IN
CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 128, 131(Christopher Ugwu eds. 2002). See
also, Kempe Hope, Politics, Bureaucratic Corruption, and Maladministration in the Third
World, 51 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. 1, 3 (1985) (“Over time, corruption corrodes popular
confidence in public institutions thus making it harder to raise the standards of public service
while deflecting public debate away from economic performance toward this single issue, as
is the case in most of the African nations. In Nigeria, for example, the daily evidence of
bureaucratic corruption has driven a wedge between public institutions and the people’s trust
in them.”).
90. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palifka, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM, 37 (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

114

HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

Vol. 45:2

giving in Africa today is no longer for appreciation alone, but also comes
with an expectation through the ulterior motives that some individuals now
assign to this practice. For example, by giving small gifts, people in Benin
attempt to “customise” their relationship with government officials to avoid
harsh treatment.91
Gift-giving may at times appear to be the same as bribery, but there is
a thin line separating the two. Gift-giving and bribery are similar in some
ways, as both contribute to corruption. In both cases, something is given by
one person to another to encourage the receiver of the gift to carry out a
desired action. There is a giver and a receiver in both gift-giving and bribery.
The gift itself may come in the form of cash or it may be in kind. Another
shared characteristic is that if disappointment occurs, neither party will have
the courage to sue the other in a court of law to demand a refund.92 The
offence of giving and receiving a bribe are well explained in the Kenyan
2016 Bribery Act in sections 5 and 6. Section 7(1)(a)(i) (“Function or activity
to which a bribe relates”) explains that a bribe can be related to “any function
of a public nature.”93
In traditional African societies, gifts were usually given to people to
thank them for a job well done.94 Additionally, leaders were sometimes
obliged to give gifts to people. This was done as a sign of acknowledgement

91. Adam Graycar & David Jancsics, Gift Giving and Corruption, 40 INT’L J. PUB.
ADMIN. 1013, 1014 (2017).
92. Otaluka, supra note 84 at 101-02. See also, Graycar, supra note 90 at 1015 (“Gifts
and bribes are both socially functional institutions and operate as complex rule systems.
According to anthropologists, both gifts and bribes are informal exchange processes regulated
by multiple (formal and informal) rule systems. Beyond their instrumental advantages, both
have important social functions which keep together social groups at different levels of
society.”).
93. The Bribery Act, No. 47 (2016) Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 143 § 5(1) (“A
person commits the offence of giving a bribe if the person offers, promises or gives a financial
or other advantage to another person, who knows or believes the acceptance of the financial
or other advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of relevant function or
activity”. Section 6(1)(a)(b)(c) stipulates: “A person commits the offence of receiving a bribe
if a) the person requests, agrees to receive or receives a financial or other advantage intending
that, in consequence, a relevant function or activity should be performed improperly whether
by that person receiving the bribe or by another person; b) the recipient of the bribe requests
for, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage and the request, agreement or
acceptance itself constitutes the improper performance by the recipient of a bribe of a relevant
function or activity; c) in anticipation of or as a consequence of a person requesting for,
agreeing to receive or accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant function or activity
is performed improperly by that person, or by another person at the recipients' request, assent
or acquiescence.”).
94. N. Egbue, Africa: Cultural Dimensions of Corruption and Possibilities for Change,
12 J. SOC. SCI. 83, 86 (2006).
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to the community for their support of the rulers.95 What is interesting in the
traditional culture of gift-giving is the type of materials offered as gifts. The
fact that gifts were often of no economic significance highlights the
difference between gift-giving and bribery in traditional society.96
Nevertheless, gift-giving––originally an innocent practice in traditional
African society––has evolved to become the ember stoking corruption. Thus,
in modern times, gift-giving encourages corruption as givers have ulterior
motives––unlike in traditional society when people were motivated by
gratitude.97 Egbue explains that, in modern times, it is no longer the person
who gives the gift who expects something, but also the potential recipient,
who believes that, if he helps the gift-giver to secure a job, a gift will follow.
The recipient of the gift may not see this gesture as corruption.98 A common
situation that occurs in universities is when there are many people vying for
the same prestigious job. In this case, employment may be given based on
the gift received. Usually, the gift required may be significant, and this can
lead serious problems when the expected favour does not eventuate. When
it comes to employment, gift-giving disregards the consideration of merit.
The practice circumvents normal recruitment procedures and is therefore
equivalent to corruption.99 It is unfair to use corruption as a way of getting
what one is not qualified to have. However, people give gifts because they
do not have an alternative to obtain what they want. Once they have given,
they also demand to receive, and in this way, corruption becomes a vicious
cycle at the expense of society. In sum, gift-giving in modern African society
engenders corruption, especially in the public sector. This is because of the
ulterior motives of gift-givers in the context of scarce resources.100 In the
words of Gildenhuys:
[T]he purpose of ethics in the public sector is to eliminate the uncertainty
between what seems to be right and what is in effect wrong; to identify
each possibility of conflict between rights and wrong lies, however,
beyond the ability of the average person [. . .] The truth is that no member
of the public presents gifts to politicians or civil servants without ulterior
motives.101

95. Monday Ekpo, Gift Giving and Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria, in
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA: TOWARDS A SEARCH FOR CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 161, 174 (Monday Ekpo eds. 1979).
96. Otaluka, supra note 84 at 105.
97. Id. at 116.
98. Egbue, supra note 93 at 86.
99. Otaluka, supra note 84 at 107.
100. Id. at 116.
101. J.S.H. Gildenhuys, Manifestations of Corruption and Maladministration, in Ethics
and the Public Sector: Speeches and papers presented at the Second Winelands Conference
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Finally, it is interesting to note that for a number of scholars, such as
Ekpo, “[i]t is the emphasis placed on the exchange of gifts in traditional
social relations that is a particularly significant key to the meaning of the
contemporary problem of corruption in Africa.”102 As de Sardan concludes,
“[t]he borderline between corruption and everyday practices is quite thin.
The multiplication of gifts in everyday practice leaves room for the drowning
of illicit gifts within the mass.”103

IV. EXAMPLES OF DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT
CORRUPTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION

In Africa, efforts to fight corruption date back to the early days of
independence in many countries. For example, many Commonwealth
African countries have established an ombudsman’s office. The first, the
Tanzanian Office of the Ombudsman, was set up back in 1966. The mandate
of the ombudsman was to investigate cases of abuse of office in the public
administration, including cases of “outright corruption.” 104 Similarly, in
Rwanda, an office of the ombudsman was established in 2003. Its
organisation and functions were instituted by Law no. 25/2003 of 15 August
2003,105 which was modified and complemented by Law no. 17/2005 on 18
August 2005.106 The office became operational in 2004. Apart from
investigating instances of injustice in public administration, in Rwanda, the
Ombudsman has the additional task of preventing and combating corruption
and other related offences, this serves as a de facto serving as an anticorruption authority. Furthermore, Rwanda adopted an anti-corruption
policy in June of 2012,107 although higher education is not addressed
explicitly. Nevertheless, this document aims to educate the youth in the fight
against corruption through anti-corruption education, which should be
strengthened in higher institutions of learning.108

held at the University of Stellenbosch 41-2 (J.S.H. Gildenhuys eds. 1991).
102. Ekpo, supra note 94 at 174.
103. J.P. Oliver de Sardan, A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?, 37 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 25, 40 (1999).
104. Patrick Norton, The Tanzanian Ombudsman, 22 INT’L COMPAR. L. Q. 603, 625
(1973). See also, Bernard Frank, The Tanzanian Permanent Commission of Inquiry: the
Ombudsman, 2 DENVER J. INT’L L. P OL’Y 255 (1972); Mark Kimicha, The Ombudsman and
the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, 12 J. OF ADMIN. OVERSEAS 46 (1973).
105. Establishing the Organization and Functioning of the Office of the Ombudsman, No.
25 (2003) (Rwanda).
106. Ombudsman, No. 17 (2005) (Rwanda).
107. Rwanda Anti-Corruption Policy (June 2010).
108. Id. at 10. For a general analysis of higher education in Rwanda, see also, Aryn Baxter,
Higher Education Mission and Vision in Rwanda: A Comparative and Critical Discourse
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The Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act (PCCAA) 109
is the key statute on corruption in South Africa, a country that has been
experiencing continuous high levels of corruption over the past years. 110
Although it does not address the issue of corruption directly in relation to
higher education, the PCCAA is comprehensive, creating a general offence
of corruption and specific offences with reference to corrupt activities
relating to public officers, members of the legislative authority, judicial
officers and members of the prosecuting authority.111 It also provides for
investigative measures112 as well as preventative measures in the fight
against corruption.113 Another relevant instrument is the Public Services
Act,114 which provides for the organisation and administration of the public
service. The act regulates conditions of employment and discipline within
the public service. Section 41(1)(b)(v) requires the Minister for the Public
Service and Administration to make regulations on a Code of Conduct, in
terms of which public servants must act in the best interests of the public, act
honestly in dealing with public money and report fraud and corruption.115
The code also prohibits employees from undertaking outside remunerative
Analysis, 2 RECONSIDERING DEVELOPMENT 1-26 (2012): “The success of the country’s current
leadership in targeting corruption and its strong history of collaboration between the
government and development partners have made it a desirable context for donor
organizations to operate.”
109. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities, Act No.12 (28 April 2004). For an
analysis of the PCCAA see, e.g., Zaakir Mohamed, Fundamentals of Anti-Bribery and AntiCorruption Compliance in South Africa, 3/2 J. OF ANTI-CORRUPTION L. 193, 194-196 (2019).
110. Trevor Budhram and Nicolaas Geldenhuys, Corruption in South Africa: the Demise
of Nation: New and Improved Strategies to Combat Corruption, 31 S. AFR. J. OF CRIM. JUST.
26, 26-57 (2018). At 57, the authors explain: “[C]orruption in its many forms has penetrated
insidiously into South African society. This is an indisputable fact, which cannot be ignored.
The effectiveness of law enforcement and the criminal justice system to combat corruption is
questionable, and government and civil society should do everything in its power to improve
efforts in this regard”. For a less recent analysis on corruption in South Africa see, e.g., Jeremy
Sarkin, Evaluating the Constitutional Court’s Decision in South African Association of
Personal Injury Lawyers v. Heath & (and) Others in the Context of Crime and Corruption in
South Africa, 118 S. AFR. L.J. 747, 747-71 (2001).
111. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities, supra note 103, at sections 3-9.
112. In this regard, see especially sections 19 (“Intentional interference with, hindering or
obstructing of investigation of offence”), 22 (“Investigations regarding property relating to
corrupt activities”) and 23 (“Application for and issuing of investigation direction in respect
of possession of property disproportionate to a person's present or past known sources of
income or assets”).
113. In this regard, see especially section 24 (“Presumptions”) and 25 (“Defences”).
114. Public Service Act (Proclamation 103 published in GG 15791 of 3 June 1994). As
amended until the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act 11 (2013).
115. John C. Mubangizi, A Human Rights Based Approach to Fighting Corruption in
Uganda and South Africa: Shared Perspectives and Comparative Lessons, 24 L.,
DEMOCRACY & DEV. 225, 234 (2020).
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work without prior approval.116 Unfortunately, the National Anti-Corruption
Strategy (2020–2030)117 does not contain any explicit reference to possible
corruption in higher education in the country. However, on several
occasions, the strategy recalls the 2014 Public Administration Management
Act (PAMA)118 establishing the Public Administration Ethics, Integrity and
Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit (PAEIDTAU: section 15). The unit
has a number of functions: “(b) to develop the norms and standards on
integrity, ethics, conduct and discipline in the public administration . . . (d)
to strengthen government oversight of ethics, integrity and discipline and
where necessary, in cases where systemic weaknesses are identified, to
intervene; (e) to promote and enhance good ethics and integrity within the
public administration.” Section 16 (“Minimum norms and standards”)
prescribes that the minister responsible for the public service and
administration may recommend minimum norms and standards regarding
integrity, ethics and discipline (section 16(1)(b)) and (16(1)(f)) “measures to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of institutions.” For the purpose of
this study, it is also worth mentioning section 4 (“Basic values and principles
governing public administration”). This section stresses that a public
institution should “(a) promote and maintain a high standard of professional
ethics; . . . (d) provide such services impartially, fairly, equitably and without
bias; . . . (g) foster transparency by providing the public with timely,
accessible, and accurate information.” Furthermore, section 12(1)
(“Directive by Minister relating to education”), in which the minister
responsible for the public service and administration, in consultation with
the minister responsible for higher education and training, may direct the
National School of Government119 to provide qualifications and non-formal
education as recognised by the National Qualifications Framework or the

116. Public Service Act, supra note 113, at section 30 (“Other remunerative work by
employees”).
117. National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 (2020).
118. Public Administration Management Act, Act No. 11 (22 December 2014).
119. Id., at section 11 (“National School of Government”): “1) The National School of
Government will, in consultation with the Minister responsible for higher education and
training, be established as a higher education institution contemplated in the Higher Education
Act, 1997 (Act No. 101 of 1997). 2) The School must, through education and training,
promote the progressive realisation of the values and principles governing public
administration and enhance the quality, extent and impact of the development of human
resource capacity in institutions.”
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South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA).120 On two occasions,121 the
PAMA refers to the 1997 Higher Education Act,122 which mentions the term
“transparency” only when it comes on the allocation of public funds to higher
education institutions. This allocation needs to be “fair and transparent”
(section 39(2): “Allocations of funds by Minister (of Education)”). Finally,
in the South African Code of Conduct for the Public Service,123 employees
must, in the course of their duties, promote transparent administration 124 and
report to the appropriate authorities any instances of corruption, nepotism or
maladministration.125 The Constitutional Court has highlighted the negative
effects of corruption:
Endemic corruption threatens the injunction that government must be
accountable, responsive and open; that public administration must not
only be held to account but must also be governed by high standards of
ethics, efficiency and must use public resources in an economic and
effective manner. As it serves the public, it must seek to advance
development and service to the public [. . .] It is incontestable that
corruption undermines the rights in the Bill of Rights and imperils
democracy. To combat it requires an integrated and comprehensive
response. The state’s obligation to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil”
the rights in the Bill of Rights thus inevitably, in the modern state, creates
a duty to create efficient anti-corruption mechanisms.126

120. SAQA is a statutory body, regulated in terms of the National Qualifications
Framework Act No. 67 of 2008. It is made up of 29 members appointed by the Minister of
Education in consultation with the Minister of Labour. SAQA is mandated by legislation to
oversee the development and implementation of the National Qualifications Framework
(NQF). The NQF is a set of principles and guidelines by which records of learner achievement
are registered to enable national recognition of acquired skills and knowledge, thereby
ensuring an integrated system that encourages lifelong learning.
121. Section 10 (“Capacity development by institutions”) and section 11 (“National
School of Government”).
122. Higher Education Act, No 1655 (19 December 1997).
123. Code of Conduct for the Public Service, No. R825 (10 June 1997).
124. Id., at para 4(4)(9).
125. Id., at para 4(4)(10).
126. Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 48/10) [2011]
ZACC 6; 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC); 2011 (7) BCLR 651 (CC) (17 March 2011). See also, e.g.,
S v Shaik and Others (Criminal Appeal) (62/06) [2006] ZASCA 105; [2007] 2 All SA 9
(SCA); 2007 (1) SA 240 (SCA) (6 November 2006) para 223: “The seriousness of the offence
of corruption cannot be overemphasised. It offends against the rule of law and the principles
of good governance. It lowers the moral tone of a nation and negatively affects development
and the promotion of human rights. […] Corruption threatens our constitutional order. We
must make every effort to ensure that corruption with its putrefying effects is halted. Courts
must send out an unequivocal message that corruption will not be tolerated and that
punishment will be appropriately severe”. In this regard, see also, what Heath affirms about
South Africa. For the author, corruption in South Africa can be defeated, among others,
“creating specific bodies to deal with corruption and effectively prosecute it — institutions
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In Southern Africa, the 2001 Protocol against Corruption adopted by
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is another relevant
document.127 The preamble of the SADC Protocol recognises that corruption
“undermines good governance, which includes the principles of
accountability and transparency.” Article 4 provides for prevention, Article
3 for detection, Articles 5–9 for punishment of corruption and Article 10 for
cooperation between member states. The protocol covers corruption in both
the public and private sectors, recognising that demonstrable political will
and leadership are essential in the fight against corruption. It affirms the need
to garner public support for initiatives to combat corruption. One of the
measures that the protocol prescribes is the development of standards of
conduct for public officials. One standard that is relevant to this study is the
call for public officials not to use their positions to obtain private gifts or
other advantages for themselves in the course of their duties.128 Carr makes
an example of corruption forbidden by Article 3(1)(c)129 of the SADC
Protocol:
Where a public official sitting on a panel with authority to peruse
confidential science funding council documents uses the information to
help his friend, a university vice-chancellor, in drafting a good bid for
research development to the research council, an offence under Article
3(1)(c) would have been committed.130

In these circumstances, it is important for SADC states to integrate the
implementation procedures of the AU Convention on Corruption with the
SADC Protocol to fight corruption more effectively.131
Kenya is another country where the problem of corruption is relevant.132
investigating corruption must be in a position to consolidate their actions and clearly define
parameters of operation. The more confusion that is evident with regard to what office does
what, the more opportunity is opened to the would-be corrupt official or businessman to strike.
Internal structures must be created that are effective and efficient and that strike fear into the
very heart of corrupt and dishonest officials.” See Heath, supra note 79 at 375.
127. South Africa is a party to SADC since 30 August 1994.
128. D.D.N. Nsereko and Z. Kebonang, The SADC Protocol against Corruption: Example
of the Region's Response to an International Scourge, 1 UNIV. OF BOTSWANA L.J. 85, 92
(2005).
129. Article 3(1) (c) stipulates “This Protocol is applicable to the following acts of
corruption: […] c) any act or omission in the discharge of his or her duties by a public official
for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or herself or for a third party”.
130. Indira Carr, Corruption, the Southern African Development Community AntiCorruption Protocol and the Principal-Agent-Client Model (2009) 5/2 INT. J. OF L. IN
CONTEXT 147-177 at 159.
131. Olaniyan Corruption and Human Rights Law in Africa, supra note 21, at 368.
132. Douglas Kimemia, Perception of Public Corruption in Kenya, 2 AFR. J. OF GOV. &
DEVELOP. 55, 56 (2013): “The rampant levels of corruption woven deep into the fabric of the
lives of most Kenyans, and in the public sector in particular, has resulted in debilitating
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In 2016, the Kenyan government dissolved the national examinations board
and ordered the arrest of its leaders after accusations of widespread cheating
in university entrance tests.133 In 2017, corrupt university officials graduated
prominent, but academically unqualified, students from shorter (than
normal) or non-existent study programs. As a result, the Kenyan
Commission for University Education134 requested several universities to
revoke these illegitimately awarded degrees.135
Kenyan legislation has provided other instruments to curb corruption.
The Public Officer Ethics Act136 contains an annex with a Code of Conduct
and Ethics for Public Universities. The code underlines the importance of
integrity and impartiality (section 5), where gifts and donations are
discouraged but not prohibited (section 9). In this regard, section 9(4) reflects
the importance of certain cultural traditions: “Where a gift is given without
the officer’s knowledge or where refusal of a gift would be offensive to
custom or might amount to bad public relations, the officer shall inform the
chief executive of the university who shall decide how the gift is to be
disposed of.” However, section 11(1) is unequivocal in condemning
activities considered to be corrupt by stating that “[a] public officer shall not
use his office to improperly enrich himself or others,” section 17 stresses that
“[a] public officer shall not practice nepotism or favouritism,” while section
21 condemns sexual harassment. In 2011, Kenya established the Ethics and
Anti-Corruption Commission, whose powers are to, inter alia, “[u]ndertake
economic, political, and social effects that can be felt everywhere.”
133. Kirya, Curbing Corruption in Higher Education, supra note 22 at 15.
134. “The Commission for University Education, hereinafter CUE, was established under
the Universities Act, No. 42 of 2012, as the successor to the Commission for Higher
Education. It is the Government agency mandated to regulate university education in Kenya.
The CUE undertakes recognition and equation of Diplomas, Degrees, Post-graduate Diplomas
and Post-graduate Certificates conferred or awarded by Foreign Universities and Institutions
in accordance with Section 5 (1) (g) of The Universities Act No. 42 of 2012; Section 5(A)(2)
of The Universities Act No. 42 of 2012, Revised Edition 2016 [2015]; Part XI of The
Universities Regulations, 2014 and The Universities Standards and Guidelines, 2014”.
Information available at http://international.ku.ac.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/KenyaCommission-for-University-Education2019.pdf (last accessed Oct. 10, 2021).
135. Kirya, Curbing Corruption in Higher Education, supra note 22 at 10. See also, id., at
9-10: “Uganda’s first lady Janet Museveni was allegedly awarded a degree in education
despite not fulfilling the requirement for teaching practice. When she was admitted as a
student, she did not go through the usual application process and the admission requirements
were waived for her.” “In Uganda, Busoga University awarded more than one thousand
degrees to (mostly) Sudanese government officials in exchange for a “premium-tuition” fee
of USD 1,000 whereas average fees are USD 300 per year. Many were admitted even though
they did not meet the admission criteria and graduated in “fast track” two-month degree
programmes. The officials, supposedly, needed the degrees to maintain their positions in the
government.”
136. The Public Officer Ethics Act, CAP 183 (Apr. 30, 2003).
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preventive measures against unethical and corrupt practices [and] conduct
investigations on its own initiative or on a complaint made by any person.”137
In 2012, the Kenyan government also adopted the Universities Act, which
promotes “inclusive, efficient, effective and transparent governance
systems” in Kenyan universities.138 However, this act does not tackle any of
the important issues in higher education, such as nepotism and bribery.
Another relevant piece of legislation in Kenya is the Bribery Act of 2016.
An alleged offence contravening section 6(1)(a)139 of this act was at the
centre of the 2018 Mbindo Kathumo case. This case involved a lecturer at
the University of Nairobi who was accused of requesting a sum of money
from a certain “Duncan Kibet with intent that he would forgive the said
Duncan Kibet for examination irregularities in the Land Forms and Soil
Formation unit, a function to which a bribe relates.”140 In his judgment,
Justice Mumbi Ngugi concluded: “[I] am . . . in no doubt that the response
to the first issue is that the appellant requested . . . a bribe with intent to
improperly perform a public function and was properly convicted of the
offence” (para 59).
Kenya is not alone in its fight against corruption in the eastern African
region, as on 28 September 2007, the Eastern Africa Association of AntiCorruption Authorities was established. This main goal of this association is
to promote regional cooperation and mutual legal and technical assistance in

137. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act (No. 22 of 2011) (Aug. 27, 2011,
revised in 2016). In detail, see section 13(2)(b)(c). See also, The Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission (Amendment) Act (No. 12 of 2015) (1 September 2015). For the analysis of the
Anti-Corruption Commission, see: Jesse Wachanga “The Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission” 34 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 673, 673 (2008): “The Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission (KACC) is a public body established by the Anti-Corruption and Economic
Crimes Act, 2003 (the Act) as the main agency with a statutory mandate to spearhead the fight
against corruption in Kenya. Established on May 2, 2003 the KACC has all the features of a
body corporate including perpetual succession, the capacity to sue and be sued, and to acquire
and dispose of property. Presently the headquarters of KACC is based at Integrity Centre in
the Capital City of Nairobi. KACC has opened a regional office at the port city of Mombasa.”
138. THE UNIVERSITIES ACT, No. 42 (Dec. 2012). For an analysis of this act, see: Gilbert
Nganga, Far-reaching reform as new universities law is enacted, UNIV. WORLD NEWS (Jan.
26, 2013), https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20130122145646505 (last
accessed Oct. 10, 2021).
139. The Bribery Act, No. 47 (Dec. 23, 2016). In detail, section 6(1)(a) (“receiving a
bribe”) stipulates as follows: “1) A person commits the offence of receiving a bribe if: the
person requests, agrees to receive or receives a financial or other advantage intending that, in
consequence, a relevant function or activity should be performed improperly whether by that
person receiving the bribe or by another person.”
140. Vincent Mbindo Kathumo v Republic (Appeal No. 23 of 2018, Sept. 30, 2020), para
1. For another, recent case involving corruption, see: Republic v Feliz Nzomo Mutinda and
Frederick Omanya Marembo (Anti-Corruption Case No. 16 of 2014, Jan. 8, 2019) where both
the accused were found guilty to have solicited and received a bribe.
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preventing and combating of corruption in the region.141 Kenya is also a party
to the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD), which is an
endeavour to fight corruption in the region,142 although IGAD has not yet
adopted any document that could provide a more detailed framework on how
to prevent and eliminate corruption. However, Ethiopia,143 another member
of IGAD, adopted the Higher Education Proclamation144 in 2009. The
proclamation explicitly recognises merit and fighting corruption as “guiding
values of institutions” (articles 7(10) and (7), respectively). Additionally,
merit is considered paramount in the recruitment of academic staff (Article
24(6): “Research and research directions”), the promotion of academics
(Article 31(1)(d): “Rights of academic staff”), the appointment of members
of the Academic Senate (Article 49(10): “The Senate”) and of the vicepresidents of a public academic institution (Article 52(3): “Appointment and
performance evaluation of President and Vice Presidents of a public
institution”).
However, I am still doubtful as to the efficacy of these legal instruments
in fighting corruption in higher education in Africa. I question whether, and
to what degree, the African stakeholders implement them, not only by
individual countries, but also by sub-regional and regional organisations. In
this regard, the AU regularly organises “anti-corruption dialogues,”145 which
aims to discuss how to enhance transparency and fight corruption through
efficient judicial systems by urging stronger action and collaboration among
the different sub-regional organisations.146 The AU proclaimed 2018 as the
African Anti-Corruption Year and, on the Africa Human Rights Day (21

141. Website of the Eastern Africa Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities,
https://eaaaca.com/about-eaaaca (last visited Oct. 10, 2021).
142. INTERNATIONAL
AUTHORITY
ON
DEVELOPMENT
(IGAD)
(2021),
https://igad.int/divisions/peace-and-security/1990-igad-provides-training-on-the-fightagainst-corruption.
143. FRED BOATENG, HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 1-6 (J.C. Shin, P.
Teixeira eds., Ethiopia Encyclopaedia of International Higher Education Systems and
Institutions 2020).
144. Id.
145. The Fifth Anti-Corruption Dialogue took place on Nov. 9-11 2021.
146. See, for example, African anti-corruption dialogue on the theme: “regional economic
communities: critical actors in the implementation of the African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption” (Concept Note, 9-11 November 2021). In this regard,
see also Outcomes of the 4th edition of the anti-corruption dialogue fighting corruption
through effective and efficient judicial systems (2-4 November 2020) para B(i): “To be a
credible and effective actor in the fight against corruption, the judicial system must fight
effectively against corrupt practices and bribes within it. Actors in the judicial system must
develop strategies in close cooperation with national anticorruption institutions to eradicate
corruption in the judiciary. Similarly, magistrates in charge of corruption procedures and
issues must be recognised for their probity and moral integrity”.
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October), it adopted a Concept Note entitled ‘Fighting corruption and
advancing human rights: Our collective responsibility.’ In this document, the
AU resolutely proclaims:
Corruption . . . matters in human rights because it compromises the ability
of Nation States to fulfil their obligation to uphold, respect and protect the
human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions and impedes the full
realization of these rights by the beneficiaries. Corruption is therefore a
structural obstacle to the enjoyment of human rights.

However, Olaniyan emphasises that while a human rights approach to
corruption is necessary, it is unrealistic to imagine that this would inevitably
and instantly eradicate extensive corruption and its associated human rights
violations across the continent.147
Several initiatives have been launched as part of the commitment made
by many African countries, either individually or at a regional or subregional level, to tackle corruption in higher education. “Tell the Truth” is a
pilot project implemented in the universities of several African countries
(e.g. Liberia and South Africa). The project aims to overcome the culture of
silence on issues related to bribery, abuse of resources and sex-for-grades.148
All stakeholders on campus––students, academic staff, and administrative
staff––can text a free short code through their mobile phones and then be
called back by an operator who gathers details about the problem.
Alternatively, they can fill in a document directly on Google to denounce the
issue.149 Subsequently, university administration and student representatives
consider the information and both sides agree on a way forward. On certain
issues, whistle-blowers have their identities protected to avoid retaliation.
Universities’ political and corporate links may create conflicts of interest and
undermine their autonomy, academic freedom, and impartiality. In this
regard, some African countries have acted more effectively than others have,
this is because they have a clearer vision of the phenomenon and make
greater efforts to curb it.

CONCLUSION: AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATION AT A CROSSROAD
According to Mbaku, the ability of a democratic system to deal

147. Olaniyan, supra note 21 at 354.
148. Wachira Kigotho, Tackling corruption in African Higher Education, UNIV. WORLD
NEWS
(Oct.
1,
2013),
https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20131001155326466
149. Tell
the
Truth
Project
Homepage,
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScC9expHcMs_UDOzCghtOpN5EAZcK6W3v
6CrXNTJ551JzUntQ/viewform?fbclid=IwAR1WUqHiRz573czYEi6OqLkAi90RwagSZ3m
HZzyhfmnwmsTfeh0b-6kqXNQ (last visted Oct. 10, 2021).
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effectively with corruption is determined by the extent to which that system
establishes institutional structures to limit itself from corrupt activities.
Openness and transparency in government communication, supremacy of
law, voluntary acceptance of and respect for the law and a robust civil society
are key elements that can curtail academic corruption at a domestic level.
For example, civil society can use its organisations to expose corruption and
force the government to prosecute those who are complicit in corrupt
activities.150 However, a state cannot efficiently deal with corruption if the
majority of its citizens do not voluntarily accept and respect the law.151 Yet,
corrupted cultures lead to distortions in the making of policy because many
citizens do not accept corruption as a crime to be severely punished. 152 An
effective anti-corruption strategy in Africa would require a combination of
legal reform and administrative reorganisation. A reduction in corruption
ensues from the building of state capacity and political modernisation.153 One
step that could be adopted in this direction would be to amend the
constitutions of many African countries to specifically recognise corruption
as a violation of human rights. Preventing and combating corruption is
possible only if the legal framework against corruption is entrenched in the
constitutional foundation of a state and is consistent with the fundamental
principles of the rule of law.154 It is also clear that African states should
review and adopt national legislation to align them with their international
anti-corruption commitments under both the AU Convention on Corruption
and the UNCAC.155 Public education programmes aimed at developing anticorruption awareness would complement such reforms.156
Moreover, curricula should emphasise values such as integrity and
honesty, which are points of reference for progress in any society.157
Academic corruption may have negative repercussions not only in the short
but also in the long term. Academic dishonesty in higher education
institutions produces semi-educated professionals.158 These poorly trained

150. Supra note 6. See also, Olaniyan, supra note 21, at 368-369.
151. Id. at 373.
152. Adam Graycar, Corruption: Classification and Analysis, 34/3 POL’Y & SOC’Y, 87-96
at 95 (2015).
153. Nel., supra note 9 at 660.
154. Olaniyan, supra note 21 at 359.
155. Id., at 361.
156. Alhaji B.M. Marong, Toward a Normative Consensus Against Corruption: Legal
Effects of the Principles to Combat Corruption in Africa, 30/2 DENVER J. OF INT’L L. & POL’Y
99, 104 (2002).
157. Nsongurua Udombana, Fighting Corruption Seriously? Africa's Anti-Corruption
Convention, 7 SINGAPORE J. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 447, 486 (2003).
158. Feday, supra note 38 at 17.
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professionals can have a negative impact on society from the day they start
to work. Finally, African universities should realise that merit is a reflection
of democracy. Any appointment based on patronage, and nepotism should
be fought against.159 Perhaps de Sardan is right when he proposes
[m]ovements of a ‘puritanical’ tendency, intended to bring about a reform
of public morals (which can assume, in Islam as in Christianity, a
fundamentalist hue) may be among the ultimate means . . . to attempt to
change the present course of affairs.160

In reality, it is unlikely that corruption will ever be completely
eradicated because, as it is often said, man is corrupt by nature. Despite this,
we must continue to make a concerted effort to reduce corruption to its barest
minimum.161

159. Mosha, supra note 1 at 106.
160. de Sardan, supra note 102 at 48. See, Teklu, supra note 48 at 4. However, as noted
by Zalanga: “Africans should expect no one from outside the continent to solve this problem
[corruption] for them. And they should not expect a religious miracle to get them out of this
quagmire, as fifty years of successful expansion and penetration of Islam and Christianity into
the continent does not seem to have halted the worsening problem of corruption in public
institutions”. See, Zalanga, supra note 3 at 880.
161. THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF AFRICAN POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT
582 (Samuel Ojo Oloruntoba & Toyin Falola eds. 2018)); see also, Heath, supra note 79, at
375.

